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Abstract
We propose a theory for modeling concepts that uses the state-context-property theory (SCOP), a gener-
alization of the quantum formalism, whose basic notions are states, contexts and properties. This theory
enables us to incorporate context into the mathematical structure used to describe a concept, and thereby
model how context influences the typicality of a single exemplar and the applicability of a single property of
a concept. We introduce the notion ‘state of a concept’ to account for this contextual influence, and show
that the structure of the set of contexts and of the set of properties of a concept is a complete orthocomple-
mented lattice. The structural study in this article is a preparation for a numerical mathematical theory of
concepts that allows the description of the combination of concepts [21].
Keywords: concept, context, quantum mechanics, quantum structure, state, property, exemplar,
category, prototype, memory.
1 Introduction
Heinz von Foerster often spoke of how he was introduced to the scientific community in the United States in
1949 [30]. A prominent role was played by a book he had published in Vienna, which put forward a theory
of memory that uses quantum mechanics as an explanatory system [26]. Specifically, he proposed that the
forgetting process follows a decay which is the same as radioactive decay, and that remembering happens when
one is prompted to retrieve something that has not yet decayed. Excitingly, his ‘forgetting parameter’ turned
out to fit perfectly Ebbinghaus’ empirical forgetting curve [23, 24]. Von Foerster also remarked that the decay
constants for typical macromolecules—biological molecules—are exactly the same. Thus he suggested that there
is a link between the quantum mechanical interpretation of large biological molecules, and our way of keeping
things in mind or forgetting them.
When von Foerster arrived in the United States, Warren McCulloch, head of the Department of Neuropsy-
chiatry at the University of Illinois in Chicago, was intrigued by his ideas about memory. In von Foerster’s own
words [30]: “It turned out that about two or three months before I came there had been a large meeting of some
big scientists in America about memory. And they all had lots of data, but no theory. The fascinating thing
is that this little booklet of mine had numbers that were matching exactly the data they had . . . . I remember
∗To appear in Kybernetes, Summer 2004.
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that Warren told me that it was too good to be true, and asked me to give a lecture on the spot. I replied
I couldn’t give a lecture because of my linguistic inability, but there were so many immigrants—German and
Austrian immigrants—at the University of Illinois at that time, that I just had to say it more or less in German
and they translated it all very nicely. Then Warren invited me to give another talk. He said “In two weeks we
have a conference in New York; since you’re living in New York we invite you,” and this was one of the now
very famous and legendary Macy meetings.” The Macy meetings started the research field of cybernetics, and
Heinz von Foerster became one of its leading figures.
When we were invited to contribute to this special issue in honor of von Foerster, it was natural that our
contribution would elaborate on his intuition concerning quantum mechanics and the mind. Without knowing
of von Foerster’s work on it, this had already been one of the research themes in the Center Leo Apostel (CLEA)
for some time. In [8] the structure of decision processes in an opinion pole was investigated, and it is shown
that the presence of contextual influence gives rise to a nonclassical probability model, specifically one that does
not satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms for classical probability theory. Further investigations in this direction yielded
a quantum mechanical description of the Liar Paradox [14, 13, 9], where it is shown that the contradictory
sentences of a multi-sentence Liar Paradox can be represented as an entangled state in a Hilbert space that
is the tensor product of Hilbert spaces describing the separate sentences, and the dynamics of the oscillations
between truth and falsehood is described by a Schro¨dinger equation. We also distinguished different types of
contextuality, investigating the mathematical structure they give rise to, and showed that the kind of contextual
interaction that arises in quantum mechanics, and thus the mathematical structure necessary to describe this
contextual interaction, also appears in cognition [11, 10]. This led to the development of a contextualized theory
of concepts, the mental sieves through which memories are categorized, organized, and creatively blended to
make sense of experiences [31, 32, 33].
Concepts are what we use to navigate through and make sense of the world around us, enabling us to classify
and interpret new situations in terms of previous similar ones. They can be concrete, like ‘chair’, or abstract,
like ‘beauty’. A concept is generally associated with a set of properties. For example, the concept ‘chair’ is
associated with the property ’has four legs’. Something that is a property of a particular concept can also be a
concept itself. Thus ‘scaly’ is not just a property of ‘fish’, but a concept in its own right.
According to the classical or rule-based view of concepts, which goes back to Aristotle, all instances of a
concept share a common set of necessary and sufficient defining properties. Wittgenstein pointed out that it
is not possible to give a set of characteristics or rules that define a concept. For example, how would one
define ‘game’ such that frisbee, baseball, and roulette are classified as games, while wars, debates, and leisure
walking are not [71]? Furthermore, it is often unclear whether an object is a member of a particular category;
e.g. whether a camel can be considered a vehicle [34]. One might hypothesize that this ambiguity stems from
individual differences in categorization rules. But in [41] it is shown that subjects will categorize an object as
a member of one category at one time and a member of another category at a different time. Other problems
with the classical view of concepts are reviewed in [68] and [40].
The critical blow to the classical view came from work on color; it was shown that colors do not have
any particular criterial attributes or definite boundaries, and instances differ with respect to how typical or
exemplary they are of a category [60]. This led to formulation of the prototype theory [66, 63, 64], according
to which concepts are organized around family resemblances, and consist of not defining, but characteristic
features, which are weighted in the definition of the prototype. Rosch showed that subjects rate concept
membership as graded, with degree of membership of an instance corresponding to conceptual distance from
the prototype. Moreover, the prototype appears to be particularly resistant to forgetting [37]. The prototype
theory also has the strength that it can be mathematically formulated and empirically tested. By calculating
the similarity between the prototype for a concept, and a possible instance of it, across all salient features,
one arrives at a measure of conceptual distance between the instance and the prototype. Another means of
calculating conceptual distance comes out of the exemplar theory, [44, 45, 42, 36] according to which a concept
is represented by, not a set of defining or characteristic features, but a set of salient instances of it stored in
memory. The exemplar model has met with considerable success at predicting results [45, 69]. Moreover, there is
indeed evidence of preservation of specific training exemplars in memory [70]. Although prototype and exemplar
theories have been extensively pitted against one another, neither cannot fully reproduce individual differences
in the distributions of responses across test stimuli [46], or account for certain base-rate effects in categorization
[47]. Classical, prototype, and exemplar theories are sometimes referred to as ‘similarity based’ approaches,
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because they assume that categorization relies on data-driven statistical evidence. They have been contrasted
with ‘explanation based’ approaches, according to which categorization relies on a rich body of knowledge about
the world [34]. For example, according to the theory theory concepts take the form of ‘mini-theories’ [43] or
schemata [67], in which the causal relationships amongst properties are identified.
None of the existing theories on concepts describes ‘how concepts combine’, i.e. derive the model that
represents the combination of two or more concepts from the models that represent the individual concepts.
The combination problem is considered so serious that it has been said that not much progress is possible in the
field if no light is shed on this problem [25, 39, 59, 35]. Directly related to the combination problem, already
in the eighties, the so-called ‘guppy effect’ was identified, where guppy is not rated as a good example of ‘pet’,
nor of ‘fish’, but it is rated as a good example of the combination ‘pet-fish’ [48]. General fuzzy set theory [72]
has been tried in vain to deliver a description of the guppy effect [73, 49], and also intuitively it is possible to
understand the peculiarity: if (1) activation of ‘pet’ causes a small activation of guppy, and (2) activation of
‘fish’ causes a small activation of guppy, how is it that (3) activation of ‘pet-fish’ causes a large activation of
guppy? Also the explanation based theories, since they have not lent themselves to mathematical formulation,
have not been able to model what happens when concepts combine [40, 25, 59].
In [21] we show explicitly that our theory of concepts in Hilbert space can model an arbitrary combination
of concepts by making use of the standard quantum mechanical procedure to describe the combinations of
quantum entities. We show that also the guppy effect is modeled in a natural way by our theory. In the present
article we prepare the Hilbert space description that is elaborated in [21].
2 The State Context Property Formalism
The basic ingredients of our theory are ‘states’, ‘contexts’ and ‘properties’, and thus the models built are referred
to as State Context Property Systems (SCOPs). In this section we introduce the basics of our formalism.
2.1 Contexts, States and Properties
Although traditionally the main function of concepts was to represent a class of entities in the world, increasingly
they are thought to have no fixed representational structure, their structure being spontaneously evoked by the
situations in which they arise [58, 65].
Rosch’s insight, and the basis for the ‘similarity based theories’, was that the typicality of different exem-
plars and the applicability of different properties of one and the same concept vary. As such, subjects rate
different typicalities for exemplars of the concept ‘fruit’, e.g. delivering the following classification with decreas-
ing typicality: apple, strawberry, plum, pineapple, fig, olive. For the concept ‘sports’ the exemplars football,
hockey, gymnastics, wrestling, archery, weightlifting are classified for decreasing typicality, and for the concept
‘vegetable’ this happens with carrot, celery, asparagus, onion, pickle, parsley [61, 62, 22]. The insight of our
theory is that ‘for each exemplar alone’ the typicality varies with respect to the context that influences it. In
an analogous way ‘for each property alone’, the applicability varies with respect to the context. We performed
an experiment (Section 2.2) where this ‘contextual typicality and applicability effect’ is shown and measured.
Subjects classify exemplars of the concept ‘pet’ under different contexts, e.g. the context, ‘The pet is chewing
a bone’, which results in a classification with decreasing typicality as follows: dog, cat, rabbit, hamster, guinea
pig, mouse, hedgehog, bird, parrot, snake, canary, goldfish, spider, guppy (Table 2). The same exemplars are
classified differently in decreasing typicality for the context, ‘The pet is being taught’: dog, parrot, cat, bird,
hamster, canary, guinea pig, rabbit, mouse, hedgehog, snake, goldfish, guppy, spider, and again differently for
the context, ‘Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains that he is a weird person’: spider, snake,
hedgehog, mouse, rabbit, guinea pig, hamster, parrot, bird, cat, dog, canary, goldfish, guppy (Table 2). The
effect is also measured for the applicability of a property (Table 4).
This ‘contextual typicality and applicability effect’ can be described by introducing the notion of state of a
concept, and hence consider a concept an entity that can be in different states, and such that a context provokes
a change of state of the concept. Concretely, the concept ‘pet’ is in another state under the context, ‘The pet
is chewing a bone’ than under the context, ‘Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains that he is a
weird person’. It is the set of these states and the dynamics of change of state under the influence of context
that is modeled by SCOP and by our quantum mechanical formalism in Hilbert space. The problem of the
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combination of concepts gets resolved in our theory because in combination, the concepts are in different states;
for example in the combination ‘pet-fish’, the concept ‘pet’ is in a state under the context ‘the pet is a fish’,
while the concept ‘fish’ is in a state under the context ‘the fish is a pet’. The states of ‘pet’ and ‘fish’ under these
contexts have different typicalities, which explains the guppy effect. Hence, a context is a ‘relevant context’ for
a concept if it changes the state of the concept which manifests experimentally as a change in the typicality of
exemplars and the applicability of properties. A context can itself be a concept, or aggregation of concepts, or it
can be a goal or drive state, a previous lingering thought, feeling, or experience, or ones’ physical surrounding.
Since in this article we focus on the description of the combination of concepts the contexts that we consider
are aggregations of concepts, because it are this type of contexts that play a role in way concepts combine.
The set of relevant properties of a concept is in SCOP such that also less characteristic properties are
included. Let us explain why this is he case. If the focus of a theory of concepts is on its nature as an identifier
the tendency is to concentrate on the most characteristic aspects of the concept (be they typical properties,
salient exemplars, or characteristic instances), which means that less characteristic or contextually-determined
properties will be excluded. The danger of this becomes evident when we look again at the ‘pet fish’ example.
The presence of the guppy effect shows that something happens to the concept ‘pet’ when it combines with
the concept ‘fish’, and vice versa; they interact. Moreover, it shows they interact in a way that would be hard
to predict; one might expect that if an instance is typical of one concept and typical of another, it would be
particularly typical of their combination, but the opposite is true here. The most characteristic properties—
those generally included in a model of categorization—are barely influenced in interactions with other concepts.
Whenever the concept appears, the property is present, and to more or less the same degree. For example, it is
not via the property ‘lives in a house’, typical of pets, that we can detect that the concept ‘pet’ is ‘interacting’
with the concept ‘fish’. It is via a less characteristic property of pets such as ‘likes to sit on its owner’s lap’,
which is lost completely when ‘pet’ interacts with ‘fish’ in the combination ‘pet fish’. A model that contains
enough fine structure to model interactions must incorporate those properties that are sensitive to interactions
and subject to change. Hence, apart from states, that describe the ‘contextual typicality and applicability effect’
that we mentioned, our theory does not focus alone on the most characteristic properties but also introduces
context sensitive and less characteristic properties.
Before we elaborate the SCOP theory we fix some notations. If we make claims about an arbitrary concept,
it will be denoted S and its set of states Σ (or ΣS and ΣT if more than one concept—for example two concepts
S and T—are considered). Individual states of concept S will be denoted p, q, r, . . . ∈ Σ. We introduce one
special state of a concept S called the ground state, denoted pˆ. One can think of the ground state as the state
the concept is in when it is not triggered by any particular context. We explain in Section 4.6 of [21] that it is
the state a concept is in when it constitutes a sub-concept of the compound of all concepts held in the mind.
The set of contexts relevant to a concept S will be denoted M (or MS and MT if more than one concept,
for example two concepts S and T , are considered), and individual contexts by e, f, g, . . . ∈ M, and the set of
properties of the concept S will be denoted by L (or LS and LT if more than one concept, for example two
concepts S and T , are considered), and individual properties by a, b, c . . . ∈ L. Consider the concept ‘pet’ in its
ground state pˆ and consider the context
e1 : ‘The pet is chewing a bone
′ (1)
This context consists of the situation where ‘a pet is chewing a bone’. If an example involves several states,
contexts and properties, we use subscripts. Thus p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn, . . . ∈ Σ denote states, e1, e2, e3, . . . , em, . . . ∈
M denote contexts, and a1, a2, a3, . . . , ak, . . . ∈ L denote properties. The context e1 for the concept ‘pet’ will
cause the ground state pˆ of ‘pet’ to change to another state, p1. That pˆ and p1 are different states is manifested
by fact that the frequency measures of different exemplars of the concept will be different for different states
(Table 2), and the properties will have different applicability values for different states (Table 4). In relation
with Table 2 we remark that rather than typicality values of an exemplar under different contexts we need
frequency values of this exemplar under different contexts for our theory. Typicality and frequency are linked,
in the sense that an increasing frequency will generate an increasing typicality, and vice versa. But typicality
contains more aspects than just frequency. It is well possible that for two exemplars with equal frequency, the
typicality of one of them is higher than for the other, due to the fact that although both exemplars are equally
abundant in the considered context, one of them is still more typical than the other one. The aspects contained
in typicality that are extra to frequency will be described in our theory in a different way than the aspects
related to frequency.
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2.2 The Experiment
The ‘contextual frequency and applicability effect’ that we mentioned in the foregoing section was tested in the
following experiment. The 81 participating subjects—email correspondents, i.e. friends and colleagues of the
experimenters—were presented a questionnaire by e-mail as attached file, which could then be filled out and
sent back. The questionnaire was accompanied by the following text:
This study has to do with what we have in mind when we use words that refer to categories. Think of the category ‘fruit’
and the contextual situation expressed by the sentence: “The fruit gets squeezed for a fresh drink of juice”. The examples
“orange” and “lemon” appear more frequently in this contextual situation than do the examples “strawberry” or “apple”
and certainly than “fig” or “olive”.
It is the frequency with which examples of a category appear in a specific contextual situation that we want you to
estimate in this experiment. You are to rate this frequency for each example on a 7-point scale. When you fill out 7, this
means that you feel that the example appears very frequently in the given contextual situation. A 1 means you feel the
example appears very rarely and a 0 means not at all. A 4 means that you feel the example appears moderately frequently.
Use the intermediate numbers 2, 3, 5, and 6 to express intermediate judgments.
You will see that each test consists of an A part, where we test the frequency that an example of a category appears in
a specific situation, and a B part. In this B part we test the rate of applicability of specific properties to the category in
the given situation. Consider again the category ‘fruit’ and the contextual situation “The fruit gets squeezed for a fresh
drink of juice”. The properties “mellow” and “tasty” are more applicable to ‘fruit’ in this contextual situation than the
properties “unripe” and “moldy”. Also the applicability is rated on a 7-point scale, 7 meaning very applicable, 1 meaning
almost not applicable, with 0, not applicable at all, and 4 meaning moderately applicable. Use again the intermediate
numbers 2, 3, 5, and 6 to express intermediate judgments.
When you estimate the frequency of a specific example in a situation this can refer to the amount of times that
you personally have experienced this example in this context. But your estimation of this frequency may also relate to
confrontations with this example on TV, in movies, in dreams, in your imagination, etc . . . . Don’t worry about why you
estimate that way for a certain example or property. And don’t worry about whether it’s just you or people in general
who estimate that way. Just mark it the way you feel it.
Let us examine the results obtained when subjects were asked to rate the frequency with which a particular
exemplar might be encountered in a specific context for the concept ‘pet’. The contexts are given in Table 1,
and are of the type ‘congregations of concepts’. Subjects were presented seven different contexts, here called
e1 The pet is chewing a bone
e2 The pet is being taught
e3 The pet runs through the garden
e4 Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains that he is a weird person
e5 The pet is being taught to talk
e6 The pet is a fish
1 The pet is just a pet (the unit context for ‘pet’)
Table 1: The contexts considered in the experiment.
e1, e2, . . . , e6, 1, and asked to rate on a scale between 1 and 7, the frequency with which a specific exemplar of
the concept ‘pet’ appears in this context. The 14 exemplars proposed were: rabbit, cat, mouse, bird, parrot,
goldfish, hamster, canary, guppy, snake, spider, dog, hedgehog, and guinea pig. The results of the ratings are
given in Table 2, for each exemplar and context under ‘rate’, while the relative frequency, calculated from this
rating, is given for each exemplar and context under ‘freq.’. As an example of how to interpret these data,
consider the context e1, ‘The pet is chewing a bone’. Of 100 situations of this kind, the subjects estimated that
this pet would be a rabbit in 4, a cat in 25, a mouse in 3, a bird in 2, a parrot in 2, a goldfish in 1, a hamster
in 4, a canary in 1, a guppy in 1, a snake in 2, a spider in 1, a dog in 50, a hedgehog in 2, and a guinea pig
in 3 situations (Table 2). The context 1 is the unit context. Here the subject had to estimate the frequency
of the different exemplars of the concept ’pet’ in the presence of any arbitrary context; hence in the absence
of a specific context. This means that the frequencies retrieved with context 1 correspond to the frequencies
represented by the ground state pˆ of the concept ‘pet’. By means of this experiment we are now able to explain
some of the more subtle aspects of the proposed formalism. The ground state has to describe the frequencies
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exemplar e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 1
rate freq rate freq rate freq rate freq rate freq rate freq rate freq
rabbit 0.07 0.04 2.52 0.07 4.58 0.15 1.77 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.10 0.00 4.23 0.07
cat 3.96 0.25 4.80 0.13 6.27 0.22 0.94 0.03 0.46 0.03 0.15 0.01 6.51 0.12
mouse 0.74 0.03 2.27 0.06 2.67 0.08 3.31 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.00 2.59 0.05
bird 0.42 0.02 3.06 0.08 0.63 0.02 1.41 0.04 2.21 0.17 0.15 0.01 4.21 0.08
parrot 0.53 0.02 5.80 0.16 0.44 0.01 1.57 0.04 6.72 0.63 0.16 0.01 4.20 0.07
goldfish 0.12 0.01 0.69 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.10 0.00 6.84 0.48 5.41 0.10
hamster 0.85 0.04 2.72 0.07 2.06 0.06 1.25 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.00 4.25 0.07
canary 0.26 0.01 2.73 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.86 0.02 1.08 0.07 0.14 0.01 4.79 0.08
guppy 0.14 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.10 0.00 6.64 0.46 5.16 0.09
snake 0.57 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.36 0.01 5.64 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.01 1.60 0.03
spider 0.26 0.01 0.40 0.01 1.05 0.03 5.96 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.22 0.02
dog 6.81 0.50 6.78 0.19 6.85 0.24 0.91 0.03 1.02 0.06 0.11 0.00 6.65 0.12
hedgehog 0.53 0.02 0.85 0.02 2.59 0.08 3.48 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.56 0.03
guinea pig 0.58 0.03 2.63 0.07 2.79 0.09 1.31 0.04 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.00 3.90 0.07
Table 2: Frequency ratings of different exemplars for different contexts.
retrieved by means of the unit context 1, hence in 100 situations of pets in any context, subjects estimated that
there are 7 situations where the pet is a rabbit, 12 where it is a cat, 5 where it is a mouse, 8 where it is a bird,
7 where it is a parrot, 10 where it is goldfish, 7 where it is a hamster, 8 where it is a canary, 9 where it is a
guppy, 3 where it is a snake, 2 where it is a spider, 12 where it is a dog, 3 where it is a hedgehog, and 7 where it
is a guinea pig (Table 2). Each of the considered contexts gives rise to another state of the concept ‘pet’. Let
us call p1, p2, p3, . . . , p6 the states obtained after a change provoked by contexts e1, e2, e3, . . . , e6 on the ground
state pˆ.
We have also tested the applicability values of different properties of pet in different contexts, using the 14
properties in Table 3. Subjects were asked to rate the applicability of each of the properties in Table 3 for the
a1 lives in and around the house
a2 furry
a3 feathered
a4 likes to sit on owners lap
a5 likes to be caressed
a6 can fly
a7 can swim
a8 likes to swim
a9 noisy
a10 silent
a11 scary
a12 hairy
a13 docile
a14 friendly
Table 3: The properties of ‘pet’ considered in the experiment.
same seven contexts. The results are presented in Table 4. Under ‘rate’ are the ratings on a 7-point scale, and
under ‘wt’ is the renormalization to a number between 0 and 1, called the weight of the property. Consider
‘pet’ under the context e1, ‘The pet is chewing a bone’. We see that property a2, furry has a weight of 0.66,
while under the context e4, ‘Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains that he is a weird person’ it has
a much lower weight of 0.23. On the other hand, property a3, feathered has a weight of 0.08 under the context
e1, ‘The pet is chewing a bone’, which is extremely low, while it has weight 0.84 under the context e5, ‘The pet
is being taught to talk’.
We performed a statistical analysis of the data, using the ‘t-test for paired two samples for means’ to estimate
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e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 1
rate wt rate wt rate wt rate wt rate wt rate wt rate wt
a1 5.99 0.86 6.11 0.87 6.51 0.92 2.95 0.42 4.5 0.64 4.09 0.58 6.60 0.94
a2 4.65 0.66 4.09 0.58 4.99 0.71 1.64 0.23 1.65 0.23 0.30 0.04 4.83 0.69
a3 0.58 0.08 2.95 0.42 1.15 0.16 1.73 0.25 5.86 0.84 0.09 0.01 4.11 0.59
a4 4.79 0.68 5.41 0.77 5.09 0.73 1.27 0.18 1.80 0.26 0.09 0.01 5.32 0.76
a5 5.06 0.72 5.53 0.79 5.19 0.74 1.40 0.20 2.51 0.36 0.43 0.06 5.37 0.77
a6 0.44 0.06 2.65 0.38 0.81 0.12 1.72 0.25 5.72 0.82 0.20 0.03 3.65 0.52
a7 3.44 0.49 2.91 0.42 2.83 0.40 1.79 0.26 0.84 0.12 6.99 1.00 4.23 0.60
a8 3.36 0.48 3 0.43 2.99 0.43 1.48 0.21 0.70 0.10 6.43 0.92 3.86 0.55
a9 4.33 0.62 3.42 0.49 4.05 0.58 2.80 0.40 4.81 0.69 0.20 0.03 3.68 0.53
a10 2.70 0.39 2.83 0.40 2.73 0.39 3.14 0.45 1.52 0.22 5.99 0.86 3.46 0.49
a11 2.74 0.39 1.33 0.19 1.99 0.28 5.93 0.85 0.79 0.11 1.20 0.17 1.30 0.18
a12 4.63 0.66 3.75 0.54 4.62 0.66 3.07 0.44 0.96 0.14 0.12 0.02 4.28 0.61
a13 4.49 0.64 5.17 0.74 4.74 0.68 1.25 0.18 3.43 0.49 3.48 0.50 5.20 0.74
a14 4.40 0.63 5.19 0.74 4.88 0.70 1.15 0.16 3.40 0.49 2.11 0.30 5.01 0.72
Table 4: Applicability of properties in different contexts.
the probability that the shifts of means under the different contexts is due to chance. The full analysis including
histograms can be obtained by contacting the authors. In all but a few cases, the effect of context was highly
significant. Let us give some concrete examples, and also comment on the few exceptions.
As shown in Table 2, the mean frequency of rabbit under context e1 ‘The pet is chewing a bone’, is 0.04,
while under context e2 ‘The pet is being taught’, it is 0.07. The p-value for rabbit for the two contexts e1 and
e2 is 6.79 × 10
−5; thus we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that the two means are identical and that
the measured difference in mean is due to chance. Hence the measured difference in mean reflects a genuine
context effect. In Table 5 p-values for the other exemplars are presented. The means under contexts e1 and e2
for mouse, bird, parrot, goldfish, hamster, canary, guppy and dog are sufficiently different that the p-values are
small enough to reject the null hypothesis of no difference (Table 2). This is not the case for snake, spider and
hedgehog, which were estimated with very low frequency for both e1 and e2. The resulting high p-value indicates
that the difference in mean could be due to statistical fluctuations, hence a genuine effect of context. Table 5
shows that the exemplars most relevant to the distinction between contexts e1, ‘The pet is chewing a bone’, and
e2, ‘The pet is being taught’, have the lowest p-value. Parrot has the lowest p-value of all, namely 6.30E-28.
Indeed, parrots never chew bones, while they can certainly be taught. Then come bird with 9.16E-20, canary
with 3.17E-21 and dog with 2.34E-21. For bird and canary a similar observation can be made as for parrot;
they have little affinity with ‘chewing a bone’, while quite some with ‘being taught’ (but less than parrot). For
dog, the subjects rated the affinity with ‘chewing a bone’ much higher than for ‘being taught’, thus the small
p-value. Next come cat and guinea pig with very small p-values of 6.00E-9 and 1.53E-9. Subjects rated cat with
more affinity for ‘chewing a bone’ and less for ‘being taught’, and vice versa for guinea pig. Then come rabbit,
mouse, goldfish, hamster, and guppy, with very small p-values. Although they are definitely less significant with
respect to contexts e1 and e2, the subjects rated them with significantly less affinity for ‘chewing a bone’ than
for ‘being taught’. Thus they have much smaller p-values than snake, spider, and hedgehog, which subjects
rated equally irrelevant for distinctions involving ‘chewing a bone’ and ‘being taught’.
3 The Basic Structure of SCOP
A SCOP consists not just of the three sets Σ,M, and L: the set of states, the set of contexts and the set
of properties, but contains two additional functions µ and ν. The function µ is a probability function that
describes how state p under the influence of context e changes to state q. Mathematically, this means that µ is
a function from the set Σ ×M× Σ to the interval [0, 1], where µ(q, e, p) is the probability that state p under
the influence of context e changes to state q. We write µ : Σ ×M × Σ → [0, 1]; (q, e, p) 7→ µ(q, e, p). The
function ν describes the weight (the renormalization of the applicability) of a certain property given a specific
state. This means that ν is a function from the set Σ × L to the interval [0, 1], where ν(p, a) is the weight of
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exemplar p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
e1/e2 e1/e3 e1/e4 e1/e5 e1/e6 e1/1 e2/e3
rabbit 6.79E-5 1.85E-21 0.053 2.27E-5 4.87E-6 3.44E-7 5.14E-19
cat 6.00E-9 0.15 3.03E-20 3.65E-20 1.83E-22 2.48E-10 3.24E-25
mouse 1.17E-5 1.33E-8 7.98E-18 1.99E-6 9.55E-7 0.009 0.017
bird 9.16E-20 0.94 0.13E-3 3.20E-15 0.77E-3 2.69E-22 7.12E-18
parrot 6.30E-28 0.07 0.012 1.23E-34 0.013 5.73E-10 4.78E-45
goldfish 4.27E-5 0.0015 6.84E-8 0.47 3.34E-59 3.56E-45 1.72E-7
hamster 4.42E-5 1.33E-6 0.71 7.89E-6 2.02E-6 9.20E-6 0.16
canary 3.17E-21 1.97E-15 0.12E-3 2. 75E-7 0.47 7.80E-38 8.11E-22
guppy 1.36E-3 0.73 3.35E-5 0.44 1.56E-54 9.02E-35 1.53E-8
snake 0.96 0.52E-3 2. 38E-23 0.92E-3 0.46E-2 0.72 7.23E-5
spider 0.80 0.94 1.02E-29 0.71E-1 0.59E-1 0.12E-1 5.96
dog 2.34E-21 7.21E-31 7.18E-31 3.34E-25 1.18E-32 3.03E-26 3.43E-7
hedgehog 0.90 2.13E-32 6.59E-17 0.16E-3 7.20E-5 0.14 3.48
guinea pig 1.53E-9 1.28E-9 0.13 7.57E-5 1.15E-5 1.60E-10 1.31
e2/e4 e2/e5 e2/e6 e2/1 e3/e4 e3/e5 e3/e6
rabbit 0.69E-1 5.25E-20 2.50E-22 2.27E-5 4.87E-6 3.44E-7 5.14E-19
cat 3.59E-29 5.91E-27 1.19E-40 3. 65E-20 1.83E-22 2.48E-10 3.24E-25
mouse 4.23E-7 2.38E-19 1.65E-20 1.99E-6 9.55E-7 0.90E-2 0.17E-1
bird 9.15E-8 1.03E-6 4.99E-25 3.20E-15 0.77E-3 2.69E-22 7.12E-18
parrot 4.64E-28 7.14E-29 8.03E-46 1.23E-34 0.13E-1 5.73E-10 4.78E-45
goldfish 0.14 8.31E-6 4.67E-60 0.47 3.34E-59 3.56E-45 1.72E-7
hamster 5.01E-9 7.65E-25 7.94E-27 7.89E-6 2.02E-6 9.20E-6 0.16
canary 4.64E-14 0.52 4.61E-19 2. 75E-7 0.47 7.80E-38 8.11E-22
guppy 0.09 1.81E-6 1.89E-54 0.44 1.56E-54 9.02E-35 1.53E-8
snake 4.31E-27 1.29E-8 1.25E-5 0.92E-3 0.46E-2 0.72 7.23E-5
spider 2.54E-32 0.11E-2 0.45E-3 0.71E-1 0.59E-1 0.12E-1 5.96
dog 1.14E-36 5.56E-16 1.44E-46 3.34E-25 1.18E-32 3.03E-26 3.43E-7
hedgehog 5.66E-17 8.07E-6 2.05E-7 0.16E-3 7.20E-5 0.14 3.48
guinea pig 2.47E-7 5.67E-23 2.80E-24 7.57E-5 1.15E-5 1.60E-10 1.31
e3/1 e4/e5 e4/e6 e4/1 e5/e6 e5/1 e6/1
rabbit 2.05E-19 3.14E-10 4.98E-11 0.12E-2 0.72E-1 6.40E-36 2.01E-39
cat 5.20E-22 0.92 4.49E-5 3.49E-31 0.12E-3 8.79E-27 4.90E-48
mouse 9/81E-7 2.00E-26 6.96E-27 3.28E-13 0.27 4.12E-22 7.22E-24
bird 8.08E-22 1.62E-12 9.37E-8 1.19E-6 2.02E-16 1.32E-7 1.36E-35
parrot 5.14E-33 2.29E-34 1.89E-9 3.90E-7 4.03E-36 2.41E-33 1.63E-33
goldfish 3.87E-49 8.69E-8 2.29E-58 2.35E-30 1.56E-58 1.85E-47 4.42E-54
hamster 0.05 5.41E-10 6.17E-12 2.40E-12 0.26E-1 2.08E-37 5.90E-42
canary 1.15E-41 0.16E-3 0.21E-3 2.15E-24 7.69E-7 0.56E-1 5.61E-32
guppy 2.65E-42 4.24E-7 2.26E-53 2.64E-24 2.38E-54 8.60E-41 4.61E-51
snake 6.19E-9 4.47E-32 6.46E-32 1.16E-28 0.39 1.53E-19 1.16E-9
spider 0.15 1.56E-33 1.27E-33 3.23E-31 0.71E-1 3.07E-10 8.69E-11
dog 4.50E-23 0.25E-2 1.71E-6 3.83E-30 7.17E-7 1.65E-6 1.09E-50
hedgehog 4.22E-13 1.63E-22 3.80E-23 1.93E-16 0.84E-1 2.24E-13 5.04E-14
guinea pig 0.72E-3 4.49E-10 9.28E-12 2.69E-9 0.52E-1 1.62E-29 1.16E-38
Table 5: p-values for the different exemplars and pairs of contexts
property a for the concept in state p. We write ν : Σ × L → [0, 1]; (p, a) 7→ ν(p, a). Thus the SCOP is defined
by the five elements (Σ,M,L, µ, ν). Up until this point, the SCOP we have built for the concept ‘pet’ has
been rather small. To build a more elaborate SCOP, we proceed as follows. We collect all the contexts thought
to be relevant to the model we want to build (more contexts lead to a more refined model). M is the set of
these contexts. Starting from the ground state pˆ for the concept, we collect all the new states of the concept
formed by having each context e ∈ M work on pˆ and consecutively on all the other states. This gives the set
Σ. Note that M and Σ are connected in the sense that to complete the model it is necessary to consider the
effect of each context on each state. We collect the set of relevant properties of the concept and this gives L.
The functions µ and ν that define the metric structure of the SCOP have to be determined by means of well
chosen experiments. First, however, we derive the natural structures that exist on the sets Σ, M and L.
3.1 The Lattice of Contexts
By deriving a lattice structure for the set of contexts M we will be able to show that the set of contexts has a
nonclassical (quantum-like) structure. First we identify a partial order relation onM. Consider for the concept
‘pet’ the contexts
e3 : ‘The pet runs through the garden
′ (2)
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e7 : ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat
′ (3)
e8 : ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat while barking loudly
′ (4)
These three contexts are related. We say that e7 ‘is stronger than or equal to’ e3 and e8 ‘is stronger than or
equal to’ e7. Let us denote the relation ‘is stronger than or equal to’ with the symbol ≤. This means we have
e8 ≤ e7 ≤ e3. It is easy to verify that the relation ‘is stronger than or equal to’ is a partial order relation. This
means that it satisfies the following mathematical rules. For arbitrary contexts e, f, g ∈M we have
reflexivity : e ≤ e (5)
transitivity : e ≤ f, f ≤ g ⇒ e ≤ g (6)
symmetry : e ≤ f, f ≤ e ⇒ e = f (7)
(5) means that each context is ‘stronger than or equal to’ itself. (6) means that if a first context is ‘stronger
than or equal to’ a second, and this second is ‘stronger than or equal to’ a third, then the first is ‘stronger than
or equal to’ the third. (7) means that if a first context is ‘stronger than or equal to’ a second, and this second
is ‘stronger than or equal to’ the first, then they are equal.
If a set is equipped with a partial order relation, it is always possible to verify whether for a subset of
elements of the set, there exists an infimum or greatest lower bound and a supremum or least upper bound of
this subset with respect to this partial order relation. Hence, considerM, now equipped with the partial order
relation ≤, and a subset {ei}i∈I of elements ei ∈ M, ∀i ∈ I. An element ∧i∈Iei ∈ M is an infimum of the
subset {ei}i∈I if it is a lower bound, which means that ∧i∈Iei ≤ ej ∀j ∈ I and additionally it is the greatest
lower bound, i.e. a maximum of the set of all lower bounds of {ei}i∈I . This means that for each possible context
f ∈ M that is a lower bound—hence f is such that f ≤ ej ∀j ∈ I—we have that f ≤ ∧i∈Iei. This expresses
that ∧i∈Iei is the greatest lower bound (if a greatest lower bound exists it is always unique, which means that
we can talk of ‘the’ greatest lower bound).
Let us see what this somewhat subtle notion of infimum means with respect to the set of contexts for the
concept ‘pet’. Consider the context
e9 : ‘The pet tries to catch a cat
′ (8)
We clearly have e7 ≤ e9. We already remarked that e7 ≤ e3, which means that e7 is a lower bound for e3 and
e9. If we try to conceive of a context that is stronger than or equal to e3, ‘The pet runs through the garden’,
and also stronger than or equal to e9, ‘The pet tries to catch a cat’, it will also be stronger than or equal to
e7, ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat’. An example of such a context is e8, ‘The pet runs
though the garden trying to catch a cat while barking loudly’. This shows that e7 is the infimum of e9 and e3,
hence e7 = e9 ∧ e3.
This all shows that it is plausible to require that for an arbitrary subset of contexts {ei}i∈I , ei ∈M, ∀i ∈ I
there exists an infimum context ∧i∈Iei ∈ M. Mathematically we formulate this requirement as follows: For
{ei}i∈I , ei ∈M, ∀i ∈ I there exists ∧i∈Iei ∈ M such that for f ∈M we have
lower bound : ∧i∈Iei ≤ ej ∀j ∈ I (9)
greatest lower bound : f ≤ ej ∀j ∈ I ⇒ f ≤ ∧i∈Iei (10)
Note that the infimum context corresponds to what could be called an ‘and’ context, which is why we denote
it using the logical symbol ∧ for ‘and’.
Now that the infimum or ‘and’ context has been introduced, one can ask whether a supremum context exists.
Consider the following additional context for the concept ‘pet’
e10 : ‘The pet runs through the garden barking loudly to be fed
′ (11)
One can consider the sentence ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat or barking loudly to be
fed’. At first glance this sentence does not seem to describe a possible context. However we should not fall
into the trap of identifying the context that describes this sentence with one of its instances. It is difficult to
conceive of an instance of what is expressed by a sentence like ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch
a cat or barking loudly to be fed’. Indeed, the only thing one can think of is that it is an instance of ‘The
9
pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat’ or an instance of ‘The pet runs through the garden barking
loudly to be fed’. This is because it is not possible to conceive of an instance that is typical for ‘The pet runs
through the garden trying to catch a cat or barking loudly to be fed’ is that if we consider two instances—let
us call them ‘instance 1’ and ‘instance 2’—then something like ‘instance 1 or instance 2’ is not and instance.
The reason for this is deep and rooted in the nature of the structure of the world. It is similar to the fact that
‘physical entity 1 or physical entity 2’ is not a physical entity, and ‘situation 1 or situation 2’ is not a situation.
Concretely, ‘an orange or a chair’ is not an entity. It was noted in [39] that the prototype theory has difficulty
representing the ‘or’ concept, e.g, what is the prototype of ‘a butterfly or a vegetable’. Much as there do not
exist typical instances of the concept ‘a chair or a vegetable’, there does not exist a prototype of this concept.
One can now ask whether ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat or barking loudly to be fed’
is a context? In our approach it is, but to make this clear we must explain what this context is. We will call it
the superposition context of the context ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat’ and the context
‘The pet runs through the garden barking loudly to be fed’. Let us define formally what a superposition context
is. Suppose we have a subset of contexts {ei}i∈I , ei ∈ M, ∀i ∈ I. The superposition context, denoted ∨i∈Iei,
consists of one of the contexts ei but we do not know which one. This means that if we introduce explicitly
e11 : ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat or barking loudly to be fed
′ (12)
then we have e11 = e7∨e10. This superposition context ∨i∈Iei is the supremum context for a subset of contexts
{ei}i∈I , ei ∈M, ∀i ∈ I. It is obviously an upper bound, and it is easy to verify that it is the least upper bound.
The infimum context ∧i∈Iei ∈ M of a subset of contexts {ei}i∈I , ei ∈ M, ∀i ∈ I is a context that is more
concrete than the two original contexts, and it can be expressed by the ‘and’ of language if we express the
contexts using sentences. The supremum context ∨i∈Iei ∈M of a subset of contexts {ei}i∈I , ei ∈ M, ∀i ∈ I is
a context that is more abstract than the two original contexts, and it can be expressed by the ‘or’ of language
if we express the context using sentences.
A partially ordered set that has an infimum and a supremum for any subset of its elements is called a
complete lattice. The ‘complete’ refers to the fact that the supremum and infimum exists for any subset. If
they exist only for finite subsets and not necessarily for infinite subsets the structure is called a lattice. We call
M,≤ equipped with the partial order relation ‘is stronger than or equal to’ the lattice of contexts.
3.2 The Identification of Quantum Structure
This section, like the previous one, concerns the complete lattice structure of M, but here it is approached
somewhat differently. Suppose we have a concept S, described by a SCOP (Σ,M,L, µ, ν). We say that p ∈ Σ
is an eigenstate of the context e ∈ M if the state p of a concept does not change when context e is applied to
it. Thus p is an eigenstate of the concept for the context e iff µ(p, e, p) = 1. For example, the state p3 of the
concept ‘pet’ in the situation ‘The pet runs through the garden’ is an eigenstate of the context e3, ‘The pet
runs through the garden’. The state p10 of the concept ‘pet’ in the situation ‘The pet runs through the garden
barking loudly to be fed’ is an eigenstate of the context e10, ‘The pet runs through the garden barking loudly
to be fed’, but is also an eigenstate of the context e3, ‘The pet runs through the garden’, and of the context
e12 : ‘The pet barks loudly to be fed
′ (13)
We hypothesize that if an arbitrary context e ∈ M changes an arbitrary state p ∈ Σ to a state q ∈ Σ, then q
is an eigenstate of e. This amounts to requesting that if a context affects the concept again right after it has
affected the concept a first time, this does not introduce an additional change. Such measurement contexts are
called in quantum mechanics ‘measurements of the first kind’. Another way of stating our hypothesis is to say
that we confine ourselves to contexts of the first kind, namely those that do not re-affect the state of the concept
if re-applied immediately after their first application. In quantum mechanics there do exist measurement that
are not of the first kind, and certainly in cognition there also exist contexts that are not of the first kind.
Exactly as in quantum mechanics, the mathematical model is built for SCOP by considering the contexts of
the first kind and afterward treating contexts that are not of the first kind as derived notions. A state that is
not an eigenstate of a context is called a potentiality state with respect to this context. The effect of a context
is to change a potentiality state of this context to an eigenstate of this context, and this change will be referred
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to as collapse. The complete lattice structure introduced in Section 3.1 can now be re-introduced in a slightly
different way. Let us define the map
λ :M → P(Σ) (14)
e 7→ λ(e) (15)
λ(e) = {p | p eigenstate of e} = {p | µ(p, e, p) = 1} (16)
where P(Σ) is the set of all subsets of Σ. We then define for e, f ∈M
e ≤ f ⇔ λ(e) ⊂ λ(f) (17)
which is the partial order relation ‘stronger than or equal to’ considered in Section 3.1. We suppose that for
any subset of contexts {ei}i∈I , ei ∈ M, ∀i ∈ I there exists an infimum context ∧i∈Iei and a supremum context
∨i∈Iei, which makes M into a complete lattice. We denote the zero context ∧e∈Me by 0. It is the context
that has no eigenstates. We denote the unit context ∨e∈Me by 1. It is the context for which each state is an
eigenstate.
For the infimum context ∧i∈Iei we have
∩i∈I λ(ei) = λ(∧i∈Iei) (18)
This means that p ∈ Σ is an eigenstate of ∧i∈Iei iff p is an eigenstate of each of the ei, which is why we can call
it the ‘and’ context. However, for the supremum context, we do not have the equivalent equality. We have only
∪i∈I λ(ei) ⊂ λ(∨i∈Iei) (19)
and in general not the equality of these two expressions. The fact that we do not have an equality here is what
makes our structure quantum-like.
Let us illustrate this with an example. Consider context e11 = e7∨e10. λ(e7) is the set of eigenstates of ‘pet’
for the context e7, ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat’, and λ(e10) is the set of eigenstates
of ‘pet’ for the context e10, ‘The pet runs through the garden barking loudly to be fed’. The set λ(e7) ∪ λ(e10)
is the union of the two sets λ(e7) and λ(e10). This means that if p ∈ λ(e7) ∪ λ(e10) we must have p ∈ λ(e7) or
p ∈ λ(e10). Hence p is an eigenstate of the context e7 or p is an eigenstate of the context e10. Now consider the
state of ‘pet’ corresponding to the situation ‘The pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat or barking
loudly to be fed’. We do not know which of the two alternatives, ‘trying to catch a cat’ or ‘barking loudly to be
fed’ it is, but we know it is one of them. Let us describe a concrete situation where ‘pet’ is in this state. Suppose
one has a pet that only runs through the garden barking loudly in two situations: when it is trying to catch a
cat, and when it was hungry and wants to be fed. We call home and learn that the pet is running through the
garden barking loudly. So we do not hear the barking ourselves, because this would provide enough information
for us to know which one of the two it is (perhaps the pet barks differently in the two situations). So that is
the state of the concept ‘pet’ for us at that moment. Let us call this state p11. Then p11 is an eigenstate of
the context e11 = e7 ∨ e10. Hence this means that p11 ∈ λ(p7 ∨ p10). But p11 is not an eigenstate of e7 and
it is not an eigenstate of e10. Indeed, if p11 were an eigenstate of e7, this would mean that in state p11 the
pet would be running through the garden trying to catch a cat, and if it were an eigenstate of e10 this would
mean that the pet was running through the garden barking loudly to be fed. Neither is true, which shows that
p11 6∈ λ(e7) ∪ λ(e10). Thus λ(e7) ∪ λ(e10) 6= λ(e7 ∨ e10), which proves that (19) is a strict inclusion and not
an equality. It turns out that p11 is a superposition state when we represent the SCOP in the Hilbert space of
quantum mechanics [21].
Applying analogous techniques to those in [15] and [16], it can be proven that λ(M) is a closure space.
Further structural results about SCOP can be obtained along the lines of [19, 17, 20, 18]. Having introduced
this closure space the supremum can be given a topological meaning, namely for e, f ∈ M we have λ(e ∨ f) =
λ(e) ∪ λ(f) where λ(e) ∪ λ(f) is the closure of λ(e) ∪ λ(f), which is obtained exactly, in the case of the linear
Hilbert space introduced in [21], by adding the superposition states to the set λ(e) ∪ λ(f). This is why e ∨ f
was called the superposition context of e and f .
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3.3 Orthocomplementation and Atomicity
There is another structure on M that is as important as the complete lattice structure. Consider the context
e⊥3 , ‘The pet does not run through the garden’. This context has a special relation to the context e3, ‘The
pet runs through the garden’. We call e⊥3 the orthocomplement of context e3. Obviously we have (e
⊥
3 )
⊥ = e3.
Consider the context e3, ‘The pet runs through the garden’, and the context e7, ‘The pet runs through the
garden trying to catch a cat’. Then we have e7 ≤ e3. The context e
⊥
7 is the following: ‘The pet does not run
through the garden trying to catch a cat’. Hence we have e⊥3 ≤ e
⊥
7 . We know that e7 = e3 ∧ e9. The context
e⊥7 can also be expressed as follows: ‘The pet does not run through the garden or does not try to catch a cat’.
This means that e⊥7 = e
⊥
3 ∨ e
⊥
9 . The orthocomplement is characterized mathematically as follows:
⊥ is a map
fromM to M such that for e, f ∈M we have
(e⊥)⊥ = e (20)
e ≤ f ⇒ f⊥ ≤ e⊥ (21)
e ∧ e⊥ = 0, e ∨ e⊥ = 1 (22)
The set M,≤,⊥ is a complete orthocomplemented lattice. It can easily be seen that the orthocomplement is
not a complement, due to the existence of superposition states. For example, the ground state pˆ of the concept
‘pet’ is neither an eigenstate of the context e3, ‘The pet runs through the garden’, nor of the context e
⊥
3 ,
‘The pet does not run through the garden’. This means that although λ(e3) ∪ λ(e
⊥
3 ) ⊂ λ(e3 ∨ e
⊥
3 ), this is a
strict inclusion, hence λ(e3) ∪ λ(e
⊥
3 ) 6= λ(e3 ∨ e
⊥
3 ), which would not be the case if the orthocomplement were
a complement. Considering the closure space introduced by λ we do have λ(e3 ∨ e
⊥
3 ) = λ(e3) ∪ λ(e
⊥
3 ). It also
means that the underlying logic is not classical but paracomplete [12]. In [21] it turns out that the states that
are in λ(e3) ∪ λ(e⊥3 ) and not contained in λ(e3) ∪ λ(e
⊥
3 ), are the superpositions of states in λ(e3) ∪ λ(e
⊥
3 ).
Another important notion is that of the atom of a lattice. Consider a concept and a context c ∈ M such
that c 6= 0, and for a ∈M we have that a ≤ c implies that a = 0 or a = c, then c is called an atomic context of
the concept. An atomic context is a strongest context different from the zero context.
To make this clearer, consider for a moment a small SCOP (Σ,M,L, µ, ν) of the concept ‘pet’ containing
the contexts e1, e2, e6 as they appear in Table 1. The zero context and the 1 context are also elements of
M. For each context, the orthocomplement of this context is also an element of M. This gives already
{0, 1, e1, e
⊥
1 , e2, e
⊥
2 , e6, e
⊥
6 } ⊂ M. Furthermore, we need to add all the infima different from the zero context and
all the suprema different from the unit context. For example e1 ∧ e2 is the context ‘The pet is chewing a bone
and being taught’, and this is not the zero context. The context e1∧e6 would probably normally be classified as
equal to the zero context. Indeed, a pet that is a fish does not chew a bone. However, we can invent situations
where even this infimum would not be equal to the zero context. Consider for example a movie in which a child
dreams of getting a dog as a pet, but receives a fish. In the movie, the fish is a conscious and intelligent being,
and knows the desire of the child, and just to make her happy decides to behave as much as possible like a dog.
Hence chewing a bone is something that is tried out by the fish. The example shows that the situation would be
possible where another child leaving the movie theatre with her mother, says: “Mom, that was too funny how
the fish was chewing a bone”. Since we do not want to exclude from our theory of concepts these more exotic
situations, we do not have to put e1 ∧ e6 = 0 a priori. However, what is really happening here is that different
SCOPs can be constructed starting with the same set of contexts, because one needs to decide whether some
infima will be equal to the zero context or not. But this is all right. Each different SCOP is another model. If
we want to construct a model of the concept ‘pet’ where the possibility that the pet is a fish that is chewing a
bone is important, we need to allow e1 ∧ e6 to be different from zero. If we are not interested in this, and want
a simpler model, we can put e1 ∧ e6 = 0.
Because it is our aim to show what an atomic context is, we will choose a simple model. So we put
e1 ∧ e6 = 0. Having tried out all the possible infima and suprema for a simple case we get the following:
M = {0, 1, e1, e
⊥
1 , e2, e
⊥
2 , e6, e
⊥
6 , e1 ∧ e2, e1 ∧ e
⊥
2 , e1 ∧ e
⊥
6 , e
⊥
1 ∧ e2, e
⊥
1 ∧ e
⊥
2 , e
⊥
1 ∧ e6, e
⊥
1 ∧ e
⊥
6 , e2 ∧ e
⊥
6 , e
⊥
2 ∧ e6, e
⊥
2 ∧
e⊥6 , e
⊥
1 ∨e
⊥
2 , e
⊥
1 ∨e2, e
⊥
1 ∨e6, e1∨e
⊥
2 , e1∨e2, e1∨e
⊥
6 , e1∨e6, e
⊥
2 ∨e6, e2∨e
⊥
6 , e2∨e6}. The set of atomic context, denoted
A(M), is given by: A(M) = {e1∧e2, e1∧e
⊥
2 , e1∧e
⊥
6 , e
⊥
1 ∧e2, e
⊥
1 ∧e
⊥
2 , e
⊥
1 ∧e6, e
⊥
1 ∧e
⊥
6 , e2∧e
⊥
6 , e
⊥
2 ∧e6, e
⊥
2 ∧e
⊥
6 },
counting 10 elements.
Given a context e ∈ M of a concept S, sometimes we have called p the state corresponding to this context.
When we write this, we mean the state p that the context is in under the effect of the context e if it was in the
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ground state pˆ before the context e started to influence it. If the concept is in another state than the ground
state, the same context e will influence the concept such that it is in general transferred to another state than p.
This means that there is no unique state that corresponds to a specific context. How to connect a set of states
(and hence not a unique state) to a context is expressed by the function λ as defined in (14). For a context
e ∈ M the set λ(e) is the set of eigenstates of e. The state that we have denoted p, and that is the state that
the context e changes the ground state pˆ to, is one of these eigenstates.
3.4 The Orthocomplemented Lattice of Properties
A property of a concept is described using the notions of actuality, potentiality, and weight of the property as it
relates to the state of the concept. That is how gradedness is accounted for. Referring back to Tables 3 and 4,
consider the concept ‘pet’ in its ground state pˆ. The property a1, lives in and around the house received a very
high rating for the ground state. Subjects estimated that this is a property that is almost always actual for the
ground state of the concept ‘pet’. Only under context e4, ‘Did you see the type of pet he has? This explains
that he is a weird person’, did the weight of property a4 substantially decreases. A ‘weird pet’ is considered by
the subjects to live less in and around the house. But property a1 can be considered as a very characteristic
property for the concept ‘pet’, which means that moving across the different states of ‘pet’ there is not much
change of actuality to potentiality and vice versa. This is not the case for property a6, can fly. Subjects rated
this property with weight 0.57 in the ground state, which means that the property is considered to be actual
around half of the time and potential the other half for ‘pet’ in the ground state. However for ‘pet’ in state
p1—hence under context e1—‘The pet is chewing a bone’, the rating decreases to 0.14, while for pet in state
p5, hence under context e5, ‘The pet is being taught to talk’ it increases to 0.86. Table 4 shows how a property
changes weight when the concept ‘pet’ changes from state to state under different contexts.
We say that a property a ∈ L of a concept S is actual in state p ∈ Σ iff ν(p, a) = 1. This makes it possible
to introduce a partial order relation on L as follows. For a, b ∈ L we have
a ≤ b⇔ a is actual in state p then b is actual in state p (23)
We say that a is ‘stronger or equal to’ b. This makes L into a partially ordered set. Hence we can ask about
the existence of an infimum and a supremum for this partial order. Consider a subset {ai}i∈I of properties
ai ∈ L, ∀i ∈ I of the concept S. We denote the infimum property by ∧i∈Iai and the supremum property by
∨i∈Iai. It can be shown that the infimum property is a ‘and’ property and the supremum property is a ‘or’
property. We have, for ai ∈ L, i ∈ I
ai actual for all i ∈ I ⇔ ∧i∈Iai actual (24)
one of the aj actual for j ∈ I ⇒ ∨i∈Iai actual (25)
It is important to remark that for (25) the implication ⇐ is in general not true. Indeed, consider the concept
‘pet’ and the properties a14, friendly, and a15, not friendly. Then for an arbitrary state of ‘pet’ we have that
a14 ∨ a15 is actual, i.e. ‘the pet is friendly or is not friendly’. But this does not mean that for this same state
a14 is actual or a15 is actual. Indeed, it is common to encounter a state p of ‘pet’ where ν(p, a14) 6= 1 and
ν(p, a15) 6= 1. For example, the ground state pˆ is like this, as are the states p1, p2, . . . , p6.
The structure of the set of properties of a physical entity has been the subject of intense research in quantum
axiomatics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 28, 29, 38, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Most of the results obtained in quantum
axiomatics can be applied readily to concepts being considered as entities with properties. Borrowing from the
study of State Property Systems [5, 6, 15, 16, 19, 17, 18] we introduce the function
κ : L → P(Σ) (26)
a 7→ κ(a) (27)
κ(a) = {p | p makes the property a actual} (28)
that has been called the ‘Cartan Map’ in the study of State Property Systems. Clearly we have for a ∈ L
κ(a) = {q | ν(q, a) = 1, q ∈ Σ} (29)
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and for a, b ∈ L
a ≤ b⇔ κ(a) ⊂ κ(b) (30)
The Cartan Map introduces a closure space, namely κ(L). By means of the closure space the supremum can be
given a topological meaning, namely for a, b ∈ L we have
κ(a ∨ b) = κ(a) ∪ κ(b) (31)
where κ(a) ∪ κ(b) is the closure of κ(a) ∪ κ(b), which is obtained exactly, in the case of the linear Hilbert space
introduced in the paper that follows by adding the superposition states to the set κ(a) ∪ κ(b).
The complete lattice of properties L also contains the natural structure of an orthocomplementation. Con-
sider the property a⊥3 , not feathered. This property has a special relation to the property a3, feathered. We say
that a⊥3 is the orthocomplement of property a3. Obviously we have (a
⊥
3 )
⊥ = a3. Now consider the property
a15, feathered and can swim. Then we have a15 ≤ a3. The property a
⊥
15 is the following: not feathered and
able to swim. Hence we have a⊥3 ≤ a
⊥
15. Now recall the property, able to swim, denoted a7. We know that
a15 = a3 ∧ a7. And the property a
⊥
15 can also be expressed as follows: not feathered or unable to swim. This
means that a⊥15 = a
⊥
3 ∨ a
⊥
7 . Once again, the orthocomplementation can be characterized mathematically as
follows: ⊥ is a map from L to L such that for a, b ∈ L we have
(a⊥)⊥ = a (32)
a ≤ b⇒ b⊥ ≤ a⊥ (33)
a ∧ a⊥ = 0, a ∨ a⊥ = 1 (34)
The set L,≤,⊥ is a complete orthocomplemented lattice. It can easily be seen that the orthocomplement is not
a complement, due to the existence of superposition states. For example, the ground state pˆ of the concept
‘pet’ is neither an eigenstate of the property a3, feathered, nor of the property a
⊥
3 , not feathered. This means
that although κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ) ⊂ κ(a3 ∨ a
⊥
3 ), this is a strict inclusion. Hence κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ) 6= κ(a3 ∨ a
⊥
3 ), which
would be the case if the orthocomplement were a complement. Considering the closure space introduced by
κ we do have κ(a3 ∨ a
⊥
3 ) = κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ). We will see that the states in κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ) and not contained in
κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ), are the superpositions of states in κ(a3) ∪ κ(a
⊥
3 ).
3.5 Concepts, Properties and Contexts
In SCOP a concept is described by making use of the sets of contexts and properties relevant for this concept.
However a property often is in itself a concept or an aggregation of concepts. One can wonder whether this
does not lead to circularity. We can get an insight into this question by considering the situation in quantum
mechanics. One of the relevant physical quantities of a quantum entity is its position. The context corresponding
to a position measurement is a detector screen. The detector screen in itself is a congregation of quantum
entities, namely the atoms and molecules that are the building blocks of the screen. In quantum mechanics
the detector screen is described by another mathematical notion than a quantum entity or a congregation of
quantum entities. The states of a quantum entity are described by vectors in a Hilbert space while the detector
screen is described by an orthogonal projection operator of the same Hilbert space. In [21] the states of a concept
are described by vectors of a Hilbert space and a context by an orthogonal projection operator of the same
Hilbert space. This means that also concerning this question of circularity we are in an analogous situation. The
reason that this does not lead to circularity is the following: if a specific physical entity (a specific concept) is
the focus of description by quantum mechanics (by SCOP), then the symmetry is broken, because the detector
screen (context) is not the focus of description. There could only eventually be a problem of consistency. If the
detection screen (context) is described by means of procedure for the description of the compound of different
quantum entities (concepts; this is the procedure that we develop explicitly in [21]), then this more refined
description should give the same results as the standard one by means of an orthogonal projection operator. In
quantum mechanics this problem is known as the measurement problem. We plan to study the equivalent of
the measurement problem of quantum mechanics for concepts in future research.
As for properties being also aggregations of concepts, the analogy with quantum systems is not there any
longer. Properties of a quantum entity are not aggregations of quantum entities, but they are too aggregations
of concepts. However the same more general argument applies. Since the focus is on one and only one concept
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(or on one and only one combination of concepts), a property may, without leading to a problem of circularity
be described in another way than the concept is being done. Hence we can described a property by means of
an orthogonal projection operator, as is done in [21]. Of course a similar problem of consistency appears in the
following case: suppose a property is explicitly used in a sentence, and we want to describe this sentence as a
combination of concepts. In this case, also the property will be described as a concept on its own, with the
focus on this one and only concept that in the sentence fulfills the role of a property.
4 Summary and Conclusions
In Notes on an Epistemology for Living Things, von Foerster writes ”Objects and events are not primitive
experiences. Objects and events are representations of relations [27].” This insightful comment shows clearly
that at some level he foresaw the step we have taken in this paper. If we see something and classify it as an
instance of ‘bird’, we are forging a relationship between a context—this particular experience of a particular
bird chirping in a particular tree—and our concept ‘bird’. How one experiences the concept ‘bird’ depends on
the circumstances that evoked it.
Consider the concept ‘pet’ in the two following contexts—‘The pet is chewing a bone’ and ‘The pet is being
taught to talk’. If subjects are asked to rate the typicality of a specific exemplar of ‘pet’ and the applicability
of a particular property of ‘pet’, their ratings will depend on whether ‘pet’ is considered under the first context
or the second. The exemplar dog, for example, will rate high under the first context and low under the second
context, whereas the exemplar parrot will show the inverse . Similarly with properties, furry will rate high under
the first context and low under the second, whereas feathered will show the inverse pattern. A basic aim of our
formalism is to model this type of contextual influence on a concept. Our method of incorporating contextual
influence enables us to model the combination of concepts, and hence proposes a solution to a problem that is
considered to be very important and wholly unsolved within existent theories of concepts, i.e. the combination
problem.
To incorporate the effect of contextual influence, our theory introduces the notion of ‘state of a concept’. For
the example above we introduce two states of the concept ‘pet’, i.e. one that accounts for the ratings under the
first context, and another that accounts for the ratings under the second. Thus our theory considers a concept to
be an entity comprising different states, with each of the states accounting for the different exemplar typicalities
and property applicabilities. Note that we are not just proposing that the applicabilities of properties differ
amongst different exemplars of a concept, an effect well accounted for in other theories, e.g. prototype and
exemplar theories. The applicability of a single property varies for each state, as does the typicality of a single
exemplar.
Our theory proposes the structure of a State Context Property System (SCOP) to model a concept. SCOP
consists of a set of relevant states Σ, a set of relevant contexts M, and a set of relevant properties L. An
archetypical ‘change’ modeled by the SCOP is the following. The concept, when in a specific state p contained
in Σ, accounting for the typicality values of exemplars and applicabilities of properties (in that state p), changes
to another state q contained in Σ under a specific context e contained in M, in its turn accounting for the
changed typicality values of exemplars and changed applicabilities of properties (in that state q). It is this
possibility of ‘dynamic change’ under the influence of a context within SCOP that allows us to model the
combination of concepts. When concepts combine, they mutually affect how they function as a context for each
other, and hence provoke the type of dynamical change of state that is a basic aspect of our theory. Existing
theories of concepts are unable to describe combinations of concepts because they have no means to describe
the dynamical change of state under the influence of a context, which means that they can neither describe the
change of state that one concept causes to other concepts in a combination of concepts, where this one concept
functions as a context for these other concepts.
Section 2 develops the mathematical structure of the SCOP in its most general form by identifying structures
in the set of contexts M and the set of properties L. If we consider, for the concept ‘pet’, contexts e ‘The
pet runs through the garden trying to catch a cat’ and f ‘The pet runs through the garden’, we can say that
e ‘is stronger than or equal to’ f , thereby introducing a partial order relation in the set of contexts M. By
introducing the ‘and’ context and the ‘or’ context of two contexts, setM can be shown to obtain the structure
of a complete lattice (Section 3.1). By introducing the ‘not’ context for any other context, the structure of an
orthocomplementation can be derived for M (Section 3.3). We then introduced the notions of ‘eigenstate’ and
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‘potentiality state’ for a context. A state of a concept is said to be an eigenstate for a context of this concept
if the state is not affected by the context. If the state is not an eigenstate of a context, it is said to be a
potentiality state for this context (Section 3.2).
The quantum-like structure of the SCOP is revealed if we consider that for two contexts e and f contained
inM, a state will generally not be an eigenstate of the context e ‘or’ f , if and only if it is an eigenstate of e ‘or’
an eigenstate of f (Section 3.2). Similarly, this quantum-like structure of the SCOP is revealed if we consider
that although any state is an eigenstate of the context e ‘or’ not e, we cannot say that any state is an eigenstate
of e ‘or’ an eigenstate of not e. The latter argument can easily be illustrated by means of the contrast between
context e ‘The pet runs through the garden’, and context not e ‘The pet does not run through the garden’.
Any state that does not tell us what the pet is doing is neither an eigenstate of e (indeed, in e the state of pet
changes to one in which the pet ‘runs through the garden’) nor is it an eigenstate of not e (in context not e,
the state of pet is also affected, for it changes to a state in which the pet ‘does not run through the garden’)
(Section 3.3).
A similar structure, namely that of a complete orthocomplemented lattice, can be derived for the set of
properties L of the SCOP. This structure too can be shown to be quantum-like (Section 3.4). The existence of
a complete lattice structure for the sets of contexts and properties makes it possible to construct a topological
representation of a SCOP in a closure space. In this closure space, the potentiality states whose presence makes
the SCOP quantum-like are recuperated by the closure operation (Sections 3.2 and 3.4)
The identification of the complete orthocomplemented lattice structure for the sets of contexts and properties
of the SCOP is an operational derivation, i.e. we do not make any non-operational technical hypothesis, but
merely derive the structure by taking into account the natural relations (such as the partial order relation of
‘stronger than or equal to’) that exist in the sets of contexts and properties.
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